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There are long-standing debates amongst scholars of European Union politics over the relative 
importance of member states and supranational institutions in determining what happens in the EU.  
This paper treats the case of “Brexit” as a case study, considering the positions of the EU institutions, 
France, Germany, and the V4, focusing particularly on dissociation issues, questions of migration, the 
customs union and trade, and the UK’s relationship to the single market during the first year of exit 
negotiations.  It finds that while there are distinct national priorities, EU institutions have been able 
to synthesis these rather effectively into a common position which meets member states’ priorities 
as well as their own, confirming the claims of those who emphasise the ability of EU institutions to 




Social Scientists have worked – extensively – to understand the essence of the European Union – 
what, or who, drives the process of integration, and how the EU can best be conceptualised.  At one 
end of the scale, some view it very much as an alliance of individual member states, acting to pool 
sovereignty when it suits their purposes to do so.  The actions of these member states are strongly 
conditioned by domestic political concerns.  At the other end of the scale, the EU is sometimes 
viewed as being an entity akin to a state in its own right, with supranational actors and law limiting 
individual nation states’ room for manoeuvre.  
 
This discussion is of tremendous political importance to citizens and stakeholders: if nation-states 
really do shape the nature of European integration, then it is to their preferences we must look if we 
wish to understand or change the way the EU functions, or indeed anticipate future developments.  
If, however, integration has acquired a logic of its own, attention would shift towards the views of 
EU institutions – the European Commission and the European Parliament – as well as nation states 
acting in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. 
 
In the context of the UK’s exit from the European Union, the stakes have never been clearer and 
higher.   Is the EU’s approach to Brexit driven by the European institutions, or by the wishes of 
member states?  Related to this, are there differences in the views of different actors involved, or 
are they all “on the same page”?  Understanding these issues might be of immediate, tactical benefit 
to the United Kingdom (which was criticised for seeking to “pick off” national capitals in advance of 
formal negotiations), but it is also a useful case study in how the European Union operates as one or 
not. 
 
In this paper, we examine the position of four groups of actors in relation to Brexit: the government 
of France, the government of Germany, the governments of the Visegrad countries (the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), and the position of the European institutions.  This 
selection thus considers the two most influential national governments (whose power, when they 
                                                          
1 This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency, grant no. APVV-16-0062.  The 
seminar held in Berlin was funded by the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe programme and that in Bratislava by 
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have worked together, has been to create a formidable Franco-German axis), as well as an important 
and distinctive block of member states who frequently co-operate to shape the EU’s agenda. 
 
There are good reasons to think their perspectives on Brexit may differ.  To give just a few salient 
examples: 
 
 The European institutions, and Germany, have been strongly committed to the integrity of 
the “European project” (in the past, alongside some smaller member states such as the 
“Benelux” countries.  By contrast, France has at times been more closely associated with a 
looser vision of the EU, as an alliance of member states.  France and each of the four 
Visegrad countries also have powerful domestic actors rather sceptical of the EU’s project, 
and in the cases of Poland and Hungary, these are, at the time of writing, in government. 
 In the case of three of the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia) there are 
significant numbers of expatriates living in the EU, considered as a proportion of each 
country’s overall population.  The money these earn and are, to some degree, able to return 
home, makes a resolution of questions of migration an especially important domestic 
priority.  The UK was a strong supporter of EU accession for the Visegrad countries, too.  
Slovakia has the biggest per capita car industry in the world, and this is in part linked to the 
UK (with Jaguar Land Rover’s recent investment in the country).  All this would suggest the 
Visegrad countries would have a significant interest in reaching a pragmatic agreement on 
Brexit, and would be more willing to make “sacrifices” of detriment to the wider European 
project. 
 While the UK does not share a land border with any of these countries, the existence of the 
multiple travel routes (including the Channel Tunnel) between the UK and France, and 
“juxtaposed” border controls between the UK and France under the Le Touquet treaty, give 
France a particular interest in clarifying the practicalities of customs and migration policy. 
 
We aim to focus on four discrete areas of “Brexit policy” in this analysis: the first are “dissociation” 
issues, i.e. the practicalities of the UK disentangling itself from the EU.  While these might seem of 
passing importance, resolution of the issues was set by the EU as a precondition for discussion of the 
future UK/EU relationship.  Secondly, we examine respective stances on the issue of migration.  
Thirdly, we look at the issue of the customs union, and the operation of trade tariffs between the UK 
and the EU in the future.  Fourth, we look at the relationship of the UK to the EU’s single market, 
including conditions for access, the view taken on whether the UK must comply with regulatory 
requirements, and how such compliance might be monitored.   
 
Our analysis is based upon a range of sources.  We held seminars in Berlin (with German officials) 
and Bratislava (with politicians and officials from Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) under Chatham 
House rules in January 2017, and we draw upon public pronouncements, official documents and 
well-sourced media reports.2 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.  The second section sets the scene, by 
reviewing the relevant historical and contemporary debates over who drives the EU.  The following 
four sections set out the stance of each of the four actors (or groups of actors) on the issues in 
question.  We conclude that while there are distinct national priorities, EU institutions have been 
able to synthesis these rather effectively into a common position which meets member states 
priorities as well as their own, confirming the claims of those who emphasise the ability of EU 
institutions to drive European integration on behalf  of member states. 
 
                                                          
2 In the discussions on Germany and the V4, where no specific source is indicated, these seminars are the 




Approaches to the study of European integration 
 
The most important theoretical starting point for any exploration of the nature of the EU’s Brexit 
negotiation dilemma is neofunctionalism, as associated with the work of Ernst B. Haas, but also Leon 
Lindberg and Philippe Schmitter.  Haas (1968, p. 16, cited in Rosamond 2000, p. 12) considers 
integration to be: 
 
“… the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.  The end result 
of the process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the 
pre-existing ones”. 
 
Functional pressures, in the sense of the desire for efficient markets and better regulation thereof, 
are crucial to this logic of creating a new political community beyond the nation-state. The 
development of linkages between integration in one area of the economy and others – supported by 
supranational actors such as the European Commission – is referred to as “spillover” by 
neofunctionalists. But this process can also be political as politicians and stakeholders actively look 
to constituencies and institutionalization beyond the state (Rosamond 2000, p. 60).  
 
From a neofunctionalist perspective, Brexit is completely anomalous. Why would the ratchet-like 
tightening of economic and political ties suddenly be reversed after forty years? The inability to 
account for the possibility of roll back, i.e. the reverse of spillover, is in fact a long-standing critique 
dating back to Stanley Hoffman’s analysis of Charles de Gaulle’s opposition to supranational 
integration (Hoffman 1966). Consequently, the EU’s Brexit stance needs to be approached with a 
less deterministic or teleological sense of the drivers of integration so as to account for the variation 
in actors’ and public preferences across member states. 
 
A productive way to understand the role of national politics can be found in the theory of 
“intergovernmentalism” espoused most profoundly by Andrew Moravcsik, who emphasises the 
interaction of domestic preferences, shaping national preferences, on the one hand, and those 
states’ interactions at the level of the European Council or EU Council on the other (cf .Moravcsik 
1993, 1998).  On this account, European integration (where it occurs) is a conscious choice of 
national political elites, and may empower, rather than disempower, national actors.  These are able 
to reach agreement, with quite a high degree of autonomy, in the European Council, to achieve 
efficient outcomes. 
 
The problem with applying this framework to Brexit is that Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalism largely 
presupposes low political salience, as pointed out by Hooghe and Marks (2008), to achieve an 
efficient accommodation of domestic and European interests. Coming on the back of the 
defenestration of the Constitutional Treaty (2005), the sovereign debt crisis (2010-12), and an 
unprecedented wave of migration (2015), the UK referendum came at moment when Europe as a 
political entity is incredibly politicized. That context explains the recent efforts made to understand 
the constraints facing national actors facing functional pressure for EU-wide solutions to policy 
problems where domestic audiences reject pooling more sovereignty.   Most notable here is 
Bickerton et al.’s (2015) notion of “new intergovernmentalism”, which identifies a trend for greater 
substantive integration but without supranationalism (i.e. with new institutions created that 




This tour d’horizon of theoretical approaches to integration is designed to open up points of 
departure for the empirical study of positions adopted by our selected member states. These 
countries are in the unique position of having to decide how to negotiate the UK’s dissociation from 
the EU, under the terms of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, potentially accompanied – if terms of 
withdrawal satisfy both sides – by a new free trade treaty. As a result, we draw on the above 
literature to analyse convergence and divergence regarding perspectives on the efficiency of new 
post-Brexit arrangements; we also seek to determine the salience of various issues with the 
negotiations and how this affects bargaining positions; finally, we seek to identify the degree to 
which governments and other national actors seek to manage problem-solving in tandem with or 
separate to the EU institutions. 
 
Dissociation and “process” issues 
 
Under the banner of “dissociation issues”, we understand the mechanics of Britain leaving the EU, 
both in terms of substance (in particular, citizens’ rights, financial liabilities and the border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) but also process – in particular, whether the UK’s 
desire for parallel talks on dissociation and a new agreement could be supported. The bulk of our 
data covers the Brexit talks from March 2017 to March 2018. We also comment on salient “big 




After the referendum result, the UK debate over the process of leaving the EU quickly became 
dominated by discussions regarding “hard” and “soft” gradations of Brexit (Wallace 2016). “Soft” 
Brext would entail retaining membership of the single market and/or the Customs Union. Reliance 
on WTO trading rules and no actual free trade deal with the EU would be the hardest of exits, while 
a formal transition period that gradually uncouples rules and relations is a middle ground position. 
However, the EU’s response following invocation of Article 50 is a fundamental agnosticism over the 
nature of the final future relationship. 
 
Instead, the European Council agreed a negotiating brief for its specially-appointed representative, 
Michel Barnier, to discuss with his UK counterpart, David Davis, that revolved around the process of 
withdrawal itself. Issues of citizens’ rights, financial liabilities, and the status of the Irish border were 
placed prior to discussions on the future relationship covering trade, research, or foreign policy 
(European Council 2017). This negotiating mandate and its emphasis on sequencing these topics 
prior to a new trade arrangement was supported by a resolution from the European Parliament. 
Consequently, the EU’s approach to the dissociation talks in no way precludes the hardest of 
possible Brexit scenarios i.e. failure to agree a formal withdrawal treaty.  It was also very clear that 
all negotiations would be through the official EU channels (Bilčík, 2017b), and there would be no 
“bilaterisation” with parallel communications with individual member states. 
 
By and large, the EU was able to secure its objectives at the December 2017 European Council, with 
agreement on the calculation of financial liabilities, citizens’ rights and, to some degree, shared 
ambitions on the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. (Financial Times 2018a)  The 
principle of a ‘transition period’ from March 2019 until the end of December 2020 was subsequently 
agreed, meaning the UK will no longer be represented in European institutions but will abide by its 
rules.  The hardest part of the December Council meeting concerned the Irish border question, the 
final answer to which should be provided during the transition period. However, legally-binding 
provisions for achieving a soft border have to be included in the Withdrawal Treaty prior to the end 








Emmanuel Macron, elected in May 2017, devoted lots of political capital to the question of 
European integration in his campaign. Indeed, Brexit offers the new president a chance for France to 
regain its standing in the EU system.  Brexit came up as a topic in the tetchy presidential TV debate 
that pitted Macron against his second-round rival Marine Le Pen. He was at pains to explain that 
leaving the EU – which Le Pen had threatened to do by calling a British-style In/Out referendum – 
inevitably carries a large exit bill. The French government did not want to see its contributions to the 
EU budget increased to compensate for UK withdrawal, and therefore supported the EU’s hard line 
on the UK’s exit bill (Haas and Rubio 2017). 
 
On a strategic level, the nature of UK dissociation could prove more or less favourable to certain 
French interests. France’s permanent UN Security Council seat could gain a new legitimacy as the 
voice of the EU on the international stage. Britain’s departure has once again made the Franco-
German tandem the be-all and end-all of European integration and thus created momentum for a 
new EU initiative as a show of defiance to British Euroscepticism. Macron’s hostility to UK attempts 
to participate in the single market with looser obligations is as much an instrumental as a principled 
stance because it stems from his desire to reform the Eurozone and enable the EU to protect citizens 




In public, Germany lined up behind the EU institutions – and indeed helped constitute the line – that 
dissociation issues should be resolved before talks could move on to the next phase; privately, 
German officials involved recognised that there would be some linkage between discussions of 
dissociation and the nature of future relationships  (cf. Turner / Green 2017, p. 13).  However, where 
Germany proved extremely resistant is to the notion of complete “compartmentalisation” of Brexit 
talks into subject-specific areas.  The German political class – across party lines – was most 
concerned with domestic and international threats to the project of European integration.  At home, 
sizeable parts of public opinion felt Germany had played too big a role in the “bailout” of Greece and 
other struggling Eurozone members, and had borne far more than its fair share of refugees who had 
arrived during the 2015 crisis; this, in part, had precipitated a rise in support for the populist 
“Alternative for Germany”.  Germany also saw global threats to the established European order – 
from Russian assertiveness, US challenge to established avenues of international cooperation, and 
the policy challenges associated with refugees and Eurozone stability.  In framing the response to 
Brexit, therefore, Germany was resistant to agreements with the UK which would undermine the 
integrity of the EU.  A favoured term of German politicians in talking about Brexit became 
Rosinenpickerei (“raisin”, or in English “cherry-picking”); speaking to the German parliament in June 
2016, Chancellor Merkel herself used this phrase to illustrate what would not be acceptable to the 
Germans.   
 
On the substantive issues of “dissociation”, Germany, as a significant net contributor to the EU 
budget, was acutely aware of the potential impact of losing Britain’s ongoing payments to the EU – 
this provided a rather strong incentive to resolve the matter of outstanding payments (cf. Becker 
2017).  On questions of migration, Germany had a history of offering some elements of compromise: 
in the UK’s abortive “renegotiation” of the term of its EU membership in 2016, Germany was 
influential in supporting proposals for an “emergency brake” on migration, and indeed had also 
made its own suggestions about restricting migrants’ access to benefits (Turner / Green 2017, p. 17).  
Therefore, although the country was committed to the integrity of the EU’s four freedoms, including 
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free movement of labour, migration-related aspects of dissociation were less problematic for 




In the run-up to Brexit negotiations, the UK departure brought up several important issues related to 
both the process and the content of dissociation. It is important to underline that the four Visegrad 
countries (V4) have individual preferences with respect to Brexit. At the same time there is a cluster 
of common concerns especially towards the rights of EU citizens, trade issues and geopolitical 
consequences of Brexit.  
 
One immediate effect of the UK’s disassociation from the EU will be a reduction in its geographical 
size and its population. The EU will lose its important western and Atlantic territorial anchor, some 
65 million citizens, a nuclear deterrent force and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It 
will lose important diplomatic and resource assets when it comes to projecting the EU’s geopolitical 
influence beyond its boundaries – westward vis-à-vis the transatlantic space, to the south and south-
east, with UK’s engagement in the Middle East and Turkey, and especially to the east with the UK’s 
traditional tough stance towards Russia. This has several important implications for the V4. One is 
the severing of an important transatlantic link within the EU. The other is the potential collective loss 
of influence in the EU’s eastern neighborhood (of significance as the V4 countries are located on the 
geographic fringes of the Union).   The V4 has already been struggling internally in holding a 
common line towards Russia; the UK has been a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Moscow. 
Brexit and rising divisions on how to approach Russia with less EU geopolitical power may weaken 
further the V4 both individually and collectively vis-à-vis Russia.  
 
This weakness relates directly to the internal European implications of the EU shrinking: the idea of a 
two-speed Union with a smaller and more closely integrated inner core may gain more prominence 
in political thinking across the Union after Brexit. This line of thought has a particular resonance in 
some of the founding member states, especially France and Belgium. With a new role for Franco-
German cooperation and potentially an emergence of a new “Big 3 constellation” with Italy on board 
the geopolitical focus of the EU on original and older southern member states could sideline the 
position of the V4 inside the EU, unless the Visegrad countries actively pursue their own positive 
agenda for the EU without the UK. 
 
In terms of the process the UK departure has important consequences for the political cohesion of 
the V4. One immediate issue related to Brexit negotiations and the ability of the V4 to hold a 
common line during Brexit talks on financial settlement and rights of V4 citizens as well as other 
issues – especially future trade - connected to future EU-UK arrangements. The question of the 
financial settlement (and any future financial relationship between the UK and EU) was important 
for the V4, as the countries are net recipients of EU structural funds.  While UK diplomacy tried to 
explore bilateral contacts with V4 countries in order to dent a common EU approach to Brexit 
negotiations, the Visegrad countries have held a common line and supported the EU mandate for 
the Commission so far (Visegrad 2016).  In the V4 as elsewhere, Brexit has been treated as a 
technical issue. Its political salience has been low and since 2016 overtaken by other issues on the 
EU agenda such as the reform of the Union, relations between the ins and outs in the Eurozone and 
the survival of Schengen (Meislová Brusenbauch, 2017).  In short, the workings and the future of the 
EU are more politically important than Brexit, and the V4 is content to give the European 
Commission a high degree of autonomy in these matters. Unlike in the UK, discussion of Brexit in the 
V4 has been dispassionate. The V4 are keen to address socio-economic and strategic consequences 




The disassociation process also opened a new institutional debate. Brexit brings consequences on 
the makeup and weight of European political groups in the European Parliament. Most notably, the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) will lose their major force with the departure of the 
UK’s Conservative Party whereby Poland’s Law and Justice MEPs currently account for the second 
largest national group in the ECR.  Moreover, Brexit will trigger a wider discussion on re-balancing 
the power of 27 member states. The V4 could aim to gain more voting weight in a Union without the 
UK as Göllner (2017) argues.  However, in order to stand a chance for a more powerful voice in the 
EU, the V4 must minimize intra-regional differences and raise its ability to cooperate and 
compromise with other member states, especially Germany. The important question is whether and 
to what extent the V4 can shed their recently acquired image of refuseniks (on accepting migrants 




In this section, we review the position in relation to migration, which remains a significant issue for 
the UK and the EU in the handling of Brexit – in relation to the position of EU nationals living in the 




The first priority of the EU in regards to the migration aspect of Brexit concerns securing the rights of 
EU citizens resident in the UK. To this end, the negotiating mandate of Michel Barnier indicates that 
“citizens should be able to exercise their rights through smooth and simple administrative 
procedures” (European Council 2017). But whereas the EU position on disputes in the area of rights 
is that the CJEU should continue to have jurisdiction if cases are pending prior to 29 March 2019, 
there is flexibility for an alternative mechanism for adjudicating citizenship and related issues arising 
afterwards. The caveat is that whatever is agreed must be reciprocated on both sides. 
 
Following Brexit, the EU, and particularly the Parliament, sought to clarify that free movement of 
people could not be bartered away as part of a future form of association with the UK. This 
proposed “cherry picking” of the fundamental freedoms was evident during and after the 
referendum on the British side. Even Tony Blair, a supporter of EU membership, suggested that the 
UK could be granted an exemption from free movement as a concession to allow it to remain a 
member state (Guardian 2017b). This kind of unilateral request completely ignores the EU and the 
Parliament’s explicit rejection of participation in the single market without free movement. 
 
Agreement between the UK and EU on migrants’ rights was largely reached at the December 2017 
European Council meeting.  Moreover, the transition period requested by the UK comes with the 
requirement that  EU nationals who come during this periodwill also be able to acquire the right to 




Another reason the UK may find itself at odds with France under Macron concerns the status of the 
border arrangement covered by the 2003 treaty of Le Touquet. This is a bilateral international treaty 
specific to both countries that has no relation to the EU or EU law, but it could become linked to 
overarching questions of the UK’s approach to migration after Brexit.  
 
The Le Touquet treaty allows UK authorities to be based at French ferry ports in order to carry out 
passport checks; a similar rule applies for the Channel Tunnel. In effect, this system means the UK 
border authorities can filter out travellers without proper documentation, thereby reducing the 
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number of people able to claim asylum upon landing on British soil. That is a big advantage as the 
French authorities may otherwise have an incentive to allow people to transit to Britain, because 
then they become someone else’s responsibility as can happen within the Schengen system which 
the UK opted out from. 
 
In principle, nothing prevents this arrangement from continuing after Brexit. What it depends on is 
the willingness of the French government to stick to the deal and Macron is on record as saying he 
would seek to renegotiate this agreement (The Guardian 2017c). The deal is unpopular with the 
French public and several candidates made it a topic in their campaigns for the 2017 presidency. By 
contrast, the status of EU citizens in the UK after Brexit is far less politicized, enabling France to play 




As discussed above, Germany’s position is that the “four freedoms” of the European Union are not 
to be “unpicked” by the United Kingdom, and that means that free movement of labour must 
continue or access to the single market would be restricted.  At the same time, there may be room 
for manoeuvre at the margins on this: Germany agreed on the “emergency brake” on migration in 
the context of the UK’s membership renegotiation, and politicians across the political spectrum have 
stated that, in some circumstances, national borders may need to have controls (as part of a political 
response to the refugee crisis).  Chancellor Merkel responded positively to the UK’s offer to 
regularise the status of EU citizens who had lived in the UK for five years at a cut-off date to be 
specified, declaring it was a “good start” (BBC, 23rd June 2017).  Since the UK will not be seeking 
single market membership, and has already made an offer about existing EU nationals, this is an area 




Future rights of EU citizens in the UK are of crucial importance to the Visegrad countries due to the 
number of Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians but also Czechs living, working and studying the UK (for details 
see the data in Beblavý et al 2016).  The UK was historically perceived as the champion of EU 
enlargement and the single market. People in the V4 still remember the UK’s bold move to open its 
labour market to Central European member states that joined the Union in May 2004, prompting 
significant numbers to move there. Brexit could bring significant economic and political 
consequences for the V4 (not least because of the importance of funds being sent back home by UK-
based workers) if it changed the position of their nationals living in the UK and led to the political 
threat from 2016 that the V4 could veto the Brexit deal unless the UK guarantees the rights of all EU 
nationals living and working in Britain (Politico, 2016) The V4 is striving to minimize both negative 
financial losses and fundamental changes to the position of EU workers in the UK; its priority is to 
secure the rights of all EU citizens already working and living there whereby the position of future 
workers in the UK must be secured on the basis of reciprocity with the position of UK citizens in the 
EU. (Visegrad 2016). 
 
 
Trade and the customs union 
 
In this section, we discuss attitudes towards trade arrangements, and in particular the relationship 
of the UK with the EU’s customs union.  This question goes to the heart of the UK’s future 






Expectations articulated by British politicians advocating EU withdrawal were that Brussels would 
pull out all the stops to avoid losing privileged access to a large market where it has a sizeable trade 
surplus. However, the EU institutions quickly adopted a common line, in tandem with the member 
states, that trade could only be discussed following progress on specific Article 50 issues discussed 
above. This institutional consensus was facilitated by the EU’s legal rules on trade which prevent 
bilateral deals, reducing the value of any individual member state breaking ranks to talk with the EU 
directly about a future trade relationship. The European Parliament reiterated the legal position on 
EU trade policy in its first Brexit-related resolution underlining its desire to maintain a united 
position across member states and EU institutions. At the time of writing, there was not yet 
“sufficient progress” to begin negotiations on trade and customs arrangements, which could open 
up new divides between the Parliament, the Council, and individual member states. 
 
Nevertheless, business interests within the EU are mindful that EU relations with third countries 
could also suffer economically and diplomatically in the collateral fallout from a hard Brexit. This is 
because international trade agreements signed by the EU would see the end of their territorial 
application to the UK, a market of 65 million consumers.  EU and British trade representatives in 
Geneva are thus cooperating already over how to facilitate WTO acceptance of the UK’s transition to 




Historically, free trade was a key component of the integration of UK global and European diplomacy 
as EU membership was a highly efficient way to advocate for reducing trade barriers in international 
fora. The absence of a British presence in the EU’s decision-making bodies presents an opportunity 
for France to recalibrate the EU’s preferences on trade. As a recent study has shown, the 
protectionist interests of French governments – of both left and right – would have more impact on 
negotiating outcomes in an EU of 27 (Hix et al. 2016). 
 
During the presidential campaign Macron was placed on the backfoot by criticism of the EU-Canada 
free trade deal, which critics presented as a backdoor route for genetically modified food products 
and inimical to climate change targets (Schön-Quinlivan 2017). To placate this opposition, Macron 
established a scientific committee to investigate the effects of the deal on French law. A UK customs 
deal would probably face similar challenges – especially if the UK wants to have as much flexibility to 
for bespoke arrangements with non-EU countries on agricultural products – creating serious 
constraints on France’s negotiating position. In this way the touted benefits of moving towards a 
Global Britain agenda synonymous with liberalizing trade internationally might be at the mercy of 




In developing its stance on customs union questions, pressures push in contradictory directions.  On 
the one hand, the country’s commitment to the “four freedoms” means that a bespoke customs 
deal with the UK risks the integrity of European integration and being seen as “cherry-picking”.  On 
the other hand, mutual imposition of customs controls would lead to significant complications for 
German industry where it was integrated with the United Kingdom – not only would tariffs be 
applied to German goods, but they would also be applied to product components, necessitating 
change in production processes (HZA 2017).  The German Federation of Trade Unions, in its internal 
analysis of Brexit, calls for a “deep and comprehensive free trade agreement”, akin to that between 
the EU and Ukraine, which would avoid customs duties, although proof of the origin of goods would 
still be required (DGB 2017, pp. 16-17).  Arrangements around customs are particularly important for 
10 
 
the automotive sector in Germany – around 42,500 jobs in Germany relate to the UK car market, 
with direct and indirect turnover totalling nearly 17  billion Euros per year (Deloitte 2018). 
 
Perhaps mindful of the impact on Germany industry, German policy-makers were privately 
supportive of the notion of a transitional period  in advance of this being agreed (Turner / Green 




A new agreement with the UK after Brexit will be important for preserving the V4’s trade interests. 
In relative terms the UK is an important export partner for the Czech Republic (its 4th largest 
partner), Slovakia and Hungary, especially when we take into account their second-order trade 
interests with respect to their exports to Germany (Halpern, 2016), some of which end up in the UK. 
Hence, the V4 is keen to preserve free trade in goods (cars, electronics, especially) with the UK after 
Brexit (Beblavý/Bilčík, 2016).  At the same time V4 – with the partial exception of Poland (Rosati, 
2016) – are unlikely to play an important role in discussing future arrangements for trade in services 
due to limited direct interests in this area (Bilčík, 2017a). 
 
 
The single market [and trade] 
 
In this section, we are concerned with issue of the future trading relationship between the UK and 
the EU.  This goes beyond arrangements for customs tariffs: it also concerns the ability of businesses 
of the UK to operate within the EU, and vice versa, and for goods and services to be freely traded, 




In one of his first press conferences on the Article 50 talks, EU negotiator Michel Barnier explained 
that any future UK arrangement with the single market would necessarily have to cater for problems 
of regulatory divergence (Barnier 2017).  That is, the institutional framework the EU has in mind 
must include a dispute resolution mechanism to arbitrate in conflicts over changing standards for 
goods or services. After all, one of the key drivers of Brexit was the UK’s desire for more flexibility 
outside the single market. 
 
The specifics of this dispute resolution mechanism are up for grabs following a successful conclusion 
of the points of contention hanging over the formalities of withdrawal. Two aspects of the procedure 
for establishing a new relationship are already clear from the European Council’s negotiating stance. 
Firstly, the desire to preserve the integrity of the single market means the EU excludes sector-by-
sector participation e.g. a financial services only deal or a separate one for the automotive industry. 
Secondly, any potential transition period, or what the EU guidelines call a “a time-limited 
prolongation of Union acquis”, is dependent on upholding “existing Union regulatory, budgetary, 




The Brexit process offers a number of avenues where France could play hardball when determining 
the UK’s future terms of trade with the EU single market. That would certainly be in line with 
Macron’s overall philosophy on the matter, which is best captured in his campaign quip, uttered on 
the stump in London that “the best trade agreement for Britain is called membership of the EU” (The 
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Guardian, 2017a). He also made no secret of coveting the relocation of bankers and EU agencies, 
notably the European Banking Authority, from London to Paris.  
 
Equally, discussions over a UK-EU free trade arrangement to replace EU membership provide 
Macron with broader scope for promoting French interests. Issues of regulatory equivalence, the 
term used to designate mutually agreed standards for selling goods and services, will be central to 
any such deal. France can also use Brexit as an opportunity to push for the relocation of euro-
denominated clearing operations to the Eurozone, which would encourage a maximum degree of 
job relocation to Paris (Moloney 2017).  Macron’s message to other EU members is that the single 
market ought to be considered a zone of rule- and value-based convergence and not just a realm of 
pure economic competition (Schön-Quinlivan 2017). Hence it would be logical to extend this 




Germany’s stance on this question is extremely clear, and has been enunciated both publicly and 
privately by policy-makers with a very high degree of consistency.  On the one hand, it makes plain 
that it would welcome the continued ability to trade with the United Kingdom.  However, a 
condition of this is recognition of the body of EU law – the Acquis Communautaire – by the United 
Kingdom.  Without this, and if the UK were able to adopt a divergent regulatory framework, it would 
undermine the entire basis of the Single Market and, in Germany’s estimation, the EU.  A very major 
obstacle to this was perceived to be the UK’s “red line” that it would no longer accept the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; for that reason, Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
clarification, in her September 2017 speech in Florence, that the UK would accept the “EU’s existing 
rules and regulations” during a time-limited transition phase, is helpful in moving towards German 
acceptance of such a proposal.  By contrast, the proposal to adopt all existing regulation through the 
mechanism of the Great Repeal Bill was not viewed as especially significant by German policy-
makers, as it did not cover questions of regulatory equivalence that might arise in the future (Turner 
/ Green 2017, p. 7). 
 
It will be for the new German government (the subject of negotiations between political parties at 
the time of writing) to decide whether a new legal mechanism to resolve disputes over regulatory 
equivalence after a transition period would be sufficient to overcome Germany’s doubts about the 
fairness of market access without full ECJ jurisdiction.  However, on this question it can be expected 




Real negotiations on future arrangements between the EU and the UK are yet to begin and may last 
several years beyond the British exit in March 2019 (Menon, 2017).  It is therefore both early and 
daring to make predictions on modalities and contents of a future deal. So far the Visegrad countries 
offered some clues about their respective priorities in their joint statement already on 28 June 2016: 
“Article 50 of the Treaty is the basis on which further relations with the UK should be agreed. We 
need clarity. The countries of the Visegrad Group strongly urge that the focus of the upcoming 
negotiations must be on protecting EU interests. European citizens and European companies cannot 
end up worse off than British citizens and British companies. The arrangement between the EU and 
the United Kingdom must be based on reciprocity and fairness“ (Visegrad 2016). 
 
In contrast to France and Germany, the V4 are likely to take a relatively pragmatic stance to the 
future relationship of the UK to the single market, especially in the field of goods since trade in 
services has a lower level of significance for the V4 as discussed above. Nonetheless, while the issue 
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of ECJ jurisdiction has been of low salience in the V4, the strategic focus on clarity, reciprocity and 
fairness of future EU-UK arrangements suggests that the Visegrad countries are still unlikely to 
undermine the EU’s unity in negotiating a new treaty with London. After, all trade relations between 
the V4 and Germany as well as among Visegrad countries are far more important than market 





This discussion has shown that there are some divergent priorities between France, Germany and 
the V4 when it comes to Brexit.  In particular, Germany takes a tough stance on any issues, 
particularly associated with trade and CJEU jurisdiction, which might weaken the EU at a time when 
it faces significant challenges on several fronts.  France supports this approach, while also having an 
eye to certain domestic political and economic interests.  The V4 take a pragmatic stance on issues 
associated with trade, but necessarily attach a higher priority to the position of EU migrants living in 
the UK, and also the UK’s financial obligations, since these topics are of particular importance. 
 
However, so far this has not meant that the European institutions have been unable to contain 
tensions between member states.  Indeed, our analysis points to the reverse being true: there has 
been no informal “bileralisation” of the talks, the EU has been able to respond to draw together 
different interests into its common stance, and countries have no incentive to “defect”.  In this 
regard, while the political salience of Brexit in the UK is high, it is far lower for each of the other 
actors discussed here – for the six countries in question, and the European institutions, Brexit is a 
rather “technical” question, and debates about the future of the EU, the Eurozone, and responses to 
such challenges as refugees and the EU’s place in geopolitics have a far greater salience. 
 
For scholars of EU politics, therefore, the case of Brexit provides a case study that shows, even in an 
area where there is some divergence about priorities amongst member states, EU institutions still 
retain the ability to draw together different strands of thought, and mould them into a common 
position which aligns with their own priorities, and from which national actors have no incentive to 
defect.  This appears to be a strong case of supranationalism – one which calls into question the 
assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism, at least in this particular field – and which rather 
supports the claims of neofunctionalists that harnessing divergent interests in the EU may 
strengthen the power of its central institutions.  
 
Our findings suggest that the European Commission has been an important agenda-setter during 
disassociation talks with the UK during the first year of exit talks from March 2017 to March 2018. At 
the same time, the Commission’s mandate is based on unanimous decisions by member states in the 
Council. We may still therefore see shifts in intra-EU power relations towards a greater role of 
member states during negotiations on future relations between the EU and the UK; the challenges 
around the Irish border question, for instance, have the potential to divide Ireland (which will not 
wish to compromise on avoiding a hard border) with other member states keen to see the benefits 
of a deal. Understanding individual preferences of EU countries thus remains a relevant explanatory 
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